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AN IMPROVED ROBUST FUZZY EXTRACTOR
BHAVANA KANUKURTHI
ABSTRACT
We consider the problem of building robust fuzzy extractors, which allow two parties
holding similar random variables W , W ′ to agree on a secret key R in the presence of an
active adversary. Robust fuzzy extractors were defined by Dodis et al. in Crypto 2006 [6]
to be noninteractive, i.e., only one message P , which can be modified by an unbounded
adversary, can pass from one party to the other. This allows them to be used by a single
party at different points in time (e.g., for key recovery or biometric authentication), but
also presents an additional challenge: what if R is used, and thus possibly observed by the
adversary, before the adversary has a chance to modify P . Fuzzy extractors secure against
such a strong attack are called post-application robust.
We construct a fuzzy extractor with post-application robustness that extracts a shared
secret key of up to (2m−n)/2 bits (depending on error-tolerance and security parameters),
where n is the bit-length andm is the entropy ofW . The previously best known result, also
of Dodis et al., [6] extracted up to (2m− n)/3 bits (depending on the same parameters).
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11 Introduction
Consider the following scenario. A user Charlie has a secret w that he wants to use to
encrypt and authenticate his hard drive. 1 However, w is not a uniformly random key;
rather, it is a string with some amount of entropy from the point of view of any adversary
A. Naturally, Charlie uses an extractor [16], which is a tool for converting entropic strings
into uniform ones. An extractor Ext is an algorithm that takes the entropic string w and a
uniformly random seed i, and computes R = Ext(w; i) that is (almost) uniformly random
even given i.
It may be problematic for Charlie to memorize or store the uniformly random R (this
is in contrast to w, which can be, for example, a long passphrase already known to Charlie,
his biometric, or a physical token, such as a physical one-way function [17]). Rather, in
order to decrypt the hard drive, Charlie can use i again to recompute R = Ext(w; i). The
advantage of storing i rather than R is that i need not be secret.
Even though the storage of i need not be secret, the authenticity of i is very impor-
tant. If A could modify i to i′, then Charlie would extract some related key R′, and any
guarantee on the integrity of the hard drive would vanish, because typical encryption and
authentication schemes do not provide any security guarantees under related-key attacks.
To authenticate i, Charlie would need to use some secret key, but the only secret he has is
w.
This brings us to the problem of building robust extractors: ones in which the au-
thenticity of the seed can be verified at reconstruction time. A robust extractor has two
procedures: a randomized Gen(w), which generates (R,P ) such that R is uniform even
given P (think of P as containing the seed i as well as some authentication information),
and Rep(w,P ′), which reproduces R if P ′ = P and outputs ⊥ with high probability for an
adversarially produced P ′ %= P .
Note that in the above scenario, the adversary A, before attempting to produce P ′ %= P ,
1We want to work in the standard model and without any computational assumptions. Therefore
ensuring data integrity using OAEP etc. is ruled out.
2gets to see the value P and how the value R is used for encryption and authentication.
Because we want robust fuzzy extractors to be secure for a wide variety of applications,
we do not wish to restrict how R is used and, therefore, what information about R is
available to A. Rather, we will require that A has low probability of getting Rep(w,P ′) to
not output ⊥ even if A is given both P and R. This strong notion of security is known as
post-application robustness.
An additional challenge may be that the value w when Gen is run is slightly different
from the value w′ available when Rep is run: for example, the user may make a typo in
a long passphrase, or a biometric reading may differ slightly. Extractors that can tolerate
such differences and still reproduce R exactly are called fuzzy [8]. Fuzzy extractors are
obtained by adding error-correcting information to P , to enable Rep to compensate for
errors in w′. The specific constructions depend on the kinds of errors that can occur (e.g.,
Hamming errors, edit distance errors, etc.).
Robust (fuzzy) extractors are useful not only in the single-party setting described above,
but also in interactive settings, where two parties are trying to derive a key from a shared
(slightly different in the fuzzy case) secret w that either is nonuniform or about which some
limited information is known to the adversary A. One party, Alice, can run Gen to obtain
(R,P ) and send P to the other party, Bob, who can run Rep to also obtain R. However,
if A is actively interfering with the channel between Alice and Bob and modifying P , it is
important to ensure that Bob detects the modification rather than derives a different key
R′. Moreover, unless Alice can be sure that Bob truly received P before she starts using
R in a communication, post-application robustness is needed.
PRIOR WORK. Fuzzy extractors, defined in [8], are essentially the noninteractive
variant of privacy amplification and information reconciliation protocols, considered in
multiple works, including [23, 1, 12, 2]. Robust (fuzzy) extractors, defined in [3, 6], are
the noninteractive variant of privacy amplification (and information reconciliation) secure
against active adversaries [13, 14, 22, 15, 18, 19].
Let the length of w be n and the entropy of w be m. Post-application robust fuzzy
3extractors cannot extract anything out of w if m < n/2, because an extractor with post-
application robustness implies an information-theoretically secure message authentication
code (MAC) with w as the key2, which is impossible if m < n/2 (see [9] for impossibility of
deterministic MACs if m < n/2 and its extension by [21] to randomized MACs). Without
any set-up assumptions, the only previously known post-application robust extractor, due
to [6], extracts R of length 23 (m−n/2− log
1
δ ) (or even less if R is required to be very close
to uniform), where δ is the probability that the adversary violates robustness. Making it
fuzzy further reduces the length of R by an amount related to the error-tolerance. (With
set-up assumptions, one can do much better: the construction of [5] extracts almost the
entire entropy m, reduced by an amount related to security and, in the fuzzy case, to error-
tolerance. However, this construction assumes that a nonsecret uniformly random string
is already known to both parties, and that the distribution on w, including adversarial
knowledge about w, is independent of this string.)
OUR RESULTS. The robust extractor construction of [6] is parameterized by a value
v that can be decreased in order to obtain a longer R. In fact, as shown in [6], a smaller
v can be used for pre-application robustness (a weaker security notion, in which A gets P
but not R). We show in Theorem 4.4 that the post-application-robustness analysis of [6]
is essentially tight, and if v is decreased, the construction becomes insecure.
Instead, in Section 3, we propose a new construction of an extractor with post-application
robustness that extracts R of length m − n/2 − log 1δ , improving the previous result by a
factor of 3/2 (more if R is required to be very close to uniform). While this is only a
constant-factor increase, in scenarios where secret randomness is scarce it can make a cru-
cial difference. Like [6], we make no additional set-up assumptions. Computationally, our
construction is slightly more efficient than the construction of [6]. Our improved robust
extractor translates into an improved robust fuzzy extractor using the techniques of [6],
with the same factor of 3/2 improvement.
2The MAC is obtained by extracting R, using it as a key to any standard information-theoretic MAC
(e.g., [20]), and sending P along with the tag to the verifier
4In addition, we show (in Section 4.3) a slight improvement for the pre-application robust
version of the extractor of [6], applicable when the extracted string must be particularly
close to uniform.
2 Preliminaries
NOTATION. For binary strings a, b, a||b denotes their concatenation, |a| denotes the length
of a. For a binary string a, for we denote by [a]ji , the substring b = aiai+1 . . . aj . If S is a
set, x← S means that x is chosen uniformly from S. If X is a probability distribution (or
a random variable), then x← X means that x is chosen according to distribution X. If X
and Y are two random variables, then X × Y denotes the product distribution (obtained
by sampling X and Y independently). All logarithms are base 2.
RANDOM VARIABLES, ENTROPY, EXTRACTORS. Let Ul denote the uniform distri-
bution on {0, 1}l. Let X1,X2 be two probability distributions over some set S. Their
statistical distance is
SD (X1,X2)
def
= max
T⊆S
{Pr[X1 ∈ T ]− Pr[X2 ∈ T ]} =
1
2
∑
s∈S
∣∣∣∣PrX1[s]− PrX2[s]
∣∣∣∣
(they are said to be ε-close if SD (X1,X2) ≤ ε). We will use the following lemma on
statistical distance that was proven in [7]:
Lemma 1. For any joint distribution (A,B) and distributions C and D over the ranges
of A and B respectively, if SD ((A,B), C ×D) ≤ α, then SD((A,B), C ×B) ≤ 2α.
MIN-ENTROPY. The min-entropy of a random variable W is defined as H∞(W ) =
− log(maxw Pr[W = w]) (all logarithms are base 2, unless specified otherwise). Follow-
ing [8], for a joint distribution (W,E), define the (average) conditional min-entropy of W
given E as
H˜∞(W | E) = − log( E
e←E
(2−H∞(W |E=e)))
(here the expectation is taken over e for which Pr[E = e] is nonzero). A computationally
unbounded adversary who receives the value of E cannot find the correct value of W with
5probability greater than 2−
eH∞(W |E). We will use the following lemma from [8]:
Lemma 2. Let A,B,C be random variables. If B has at most 2λ possible values, then
the following holds: H˜∞(A|B,C) ≥ H˜∞((A,B)|C) − λ ≥ H˜∞(A|C) − λ. In particular,
H˜∞(A|B) ≥ H∞((A,B)) − λ ≥ H∞(A)− λ.
Because in this paper the adversary is sometimes assumed to have some external in-
formation E about Alice and Bob’s secrets, we need the following variant, defined in [8,
Definition 2], of the definition of strong extractors of [16]:
DEFINITION 1. Let Ext : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l be a polynomial time probabilistic function
that uses r bits of randomness. We say that Ext is an average-case (n,m, l, ε)-strong
extractor if for all pairs of random variables (W,E) such that w ∈W is an n-bit string and
H˜∞(W | E) ≥ m, we have SD ((Ext(W ;X),X,E), (Ul ,X,E)) ≤ ε, where X is the uniform
distribution over {0, 1}r .
Any strong extractor can be made average-case with a slight increase in input en-
tropy [8, Section 2.5]. We should note that some strong extractors, such as universal hash
functions [4, 10] discussed next, generalize without any loss to average-case.
THE LEFTOVER HASH LEMMA. We first recall the notion of universal hashing [4]:
DEFINITION 2. A family of efficient functions H =
{
hi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}#
}
i∈I
is universal
if for all distinct x, x′ we have Pri←I [hi(x) = hi(x′)] ≤ 2−l.
H is pairwise independent if for all distinct x, x′ and all y, y′ it holds that Pri∈I [hi(x) =
y ∧ hi(x′) = y′] ≤ 2−2#. ♦
Lemma 3[Leftover Hash Lemma, average-case version [8]] For %,m, ε > 0, H is a
strong (m, ε) average-case extractor (where the index of the hash function is the seed to
the extractor) if H is universal and % ≤ m+ 2− 2 log 1ε .
This Lemma easily generalizes to the case when H is allowed to depend on the extra
information E about the input X. In other words, every function in H takes an additional
input e, and the family H is universal for every fixed value of e.
SECURE SKETCHES AND FUZZY EXTRACTORS. We start by reviewing the def-
initions of secure sketches and fuzzy extractors from [8]. Let M be a metric space with
6distance function dis (we will generally denote by n the length of each element in M).
Informally, a secure sketch enables recovery of a string w ∈ M from any “close” string
w′ ∈M without leaking too much information about w.
DEFINITION 3. An (m, m˜, t)-secure sketch is a pair of efficient randomized procedures
(SS,SRec) s.t.:
1. The sketching procedure SS on input w ∈ M returns a bit string s ∈ {0, 1}∗. The
recovery procedure SRec takes an element w′ ∈M and s ∈ {0, 1}∗.
2. Correctness: If dis(w,w′) ≤ t then SRec(w′,SS(w)) = w.
3. Security: For any distribution W over M with min-entropy m, the (average) min-
entropy ofW conditioned on s does not decrease very much. Specifically, ifH∞(W ) ≥
m then H˜∞(W | SS(W )) ≥ m˜.
The quantity m− m˜ is called the entropy loss of the secure sketch. ♦
In this paper, we will construct a robust fuzzy extractor for the binary Hamming
metric using secure sketches for the same metric. We will briefly review the syndrome
construction from [8, Construction 3] that we use (see also references therein for its previous
incarnations). Consider an efficiently decodable [n, n−k, 2t+1] linear error-correcting code
C. The sketch s = SS(w) consists of the k-bit syndrome w with respect to C. We will use
the fact that s is a (deterministic) linear function of w and that the entropy loss is at most
|s| = k bits in the construction of our robust fuzzy extractor for the Hamming metric.
We note that, as was shown in [6], the secure sketch construction for the set difference
metric of [8] can be used to extend the robust fuzzy extractor construction in the Hamming
metric to the set difference metric.
While a secure sketch enables recovery of a string w from a close string w ′, a fuzzy
extractor extracts a close-to-uniform string R and allows the precise reconstruction of R
from any string w′ close to w.
DEFINITION 4. An (m, %, t, ε)-fuzzy extractor is a pair of efficient randomized procedures
(Gen,Rep) with the following properties:
71. The generation procedure Gen, on input w ∈ M, outputs an extracted string R ∈
{0, 1}# and a helper string P ∈ {0, 1}∗. The reproduction procedure Rep takes an
element w′ ∈M and a string P ∈ {0, 1}∗ as inputs.
2. Correctness: If dis(w,w′) ≤ t and (R,P )← Gen(w), then Rep(w′, P ) = R.
3. Security: For any distribution W over M with min-entropy m, the string R is close
to uniform even conditioned on the value of P . Formally, if H∞(W ) ≥ m and
(R,P )← Gen(W ), then we have SD ((R,P ), U# × P ) ≤ ε. ♦
Note that fuzzy extractors allow the information P to be revealed to an adversary
without compromising the security of the extracted random string R. However, they
provide no guarantee when the adversary is active. Robust fuzzy extractors defined (and
constructed) in [6] formalize the notion of security against active adversaries. We review
the definition below.
IfW,W ′ are two (correlated) random variables over a metric spaceM, we say dis(W,W ′) ≤
t if the distance between W and W ′ is at most t with probability one. We call (W,W ′) a
(t,m)-pair if dis(W,W ′) ≤ t and H∞(W ) ≥ m.
DEFINITION 5. An (m, %, t, ε)-fuzzy extractor has post-application (resp., pre-application)
robustness δ if for all (t,m)-pairs (W,W ′) and all adversaries A, the probability that the
following experiment outputs “success” is at most δ: sample (w,w ′) from (W,W ′); let
(R,P ) = Gen(w); let P˜ = A(R,P ) (resp., P˜ = A(P )); output “success” if P˜ %= P and
Rep(w′, P˜ ) %=⊥. ♦
We note that the above definitions can be easily extended to give average-case fuzzy
extractors (where the adversary has some external information E correlated with W ), and
that our constructions satisfy those stronger definitions, as well.
3 The New Robust Extractor
In this section we present our new extractor with post-application robustness. We extend
it to a robust fuzzy extractor in Section 5. Our approach is similar to that of [6]; a detailed
8comparison is given in Section 4.
STARTING POINT: KEY AGREEMENT SECURE AGAINST A PASSIVE ADVER-
SARY. Recall that a strong extractor allows extraction of a string that appears uniform to
an adversary even given the presence of the seed used for extraction. Therefore, a natural
way of achieving key agreement in the errorless case is for Alice to pick a random seed i
for a strong extractor and send it to Bob (in the clear). They could then use R = Ext(w; i)
as the shared key. As long as the adversary is passive, the shared key looks uniform to
her. However, such a protocol can be rendered completely insecure when executed in the
presence of an active adversary because A could adversarially modify i to i′ such that
R′ extracted by Bob has no entropy. To prevent such malicious modification of i we will
require Alice to send an authentication of i (along with i) to Bob. In our construction,
we authenticate i using w as the key and then extract from w using i as the seed. Details
follow.
CONSTRUCTION. For the rest of the paper we will let w ∈ {0, 1}n. We will assume
that n is even (if not, drop one bit of w, reducing its entropy by at most 1). To compute
Gen(w), let a be the first half of w and b the second: a = [w]n/21 , b = [w]
n
n/2+1. View a,b
as elements of F2n/2 . Let v = n − m + log
1
δ , where δ is the desired robustness. Choose
a random i ∈ F2n/2 . Compute y = ia + b. Let σ consist of the first v bits of y and the
extracted key R consist of the rest of y: σ = [y]v1, R = [y]
n/2
v+1. Output P = (i,σ).
Gen(w):
1. Let a = [w]n/21 , b = [w]
n
n/2+1
2. Select a random i← F2n/2
3. Set σ = [ia+ b]v1, R = [ia+ b]
n/2
v+1 and output P = (i,σ)
Rep(w,P ′ = (i′,σ′)):
1. Let a = [w]n/21 , b = [w]
n
n/2+1
2. If σ′ = [i′a+ b]v1 then compute R
′ = [i′a+ b]n/2v+1 else output ⊥
9THEOREM 1. Let M = {0, 1}n. Setting v = n/2 − %, the above construction is an
(m, %, 0, ε)− fuzzy extractor with robustness δ, for any m, %, ε, δ satisfying % ≤ m−n/2−
log 1δ as long as m ≥ n/2 + 2 log
1
ε .
If ε is so low that the constraint m ≥ n/2+2 log 1ε is not satisfied, then the construction
can be modified as shown in Section 3.1.
Proof. EXTRACTION. Our goal is to show that R is nearly uniform given P . To do so,
we first show that the function hi(a, b) = (σ, R) is a universal hash family. Indeed, for
(a, b) %= (a′, b′) consider
Pr
i
[hi(a, b) = hi(a
′, b′)] = Pr
i
[ia+ b = ia′ + b′]
= Pr
i
[i(a− a′) = (b− b′)]
≤ 2−n/2 .
To see the last inequality recall that (a, b) %= (a′, b′). Therefore, if a = a′, then b %= b′ making
the Pri[i(a− a′) = (b− b′)] = 0. If a %= a′, then there is a unique i = (b− b′)/(a− a′) that
satisfies the equality. Since i is chosen randomly from F2n/2 , the probability of the specific
i occurring is 2−n/2.
Because |(R,σ)| = n/2, Lemma 2 gives us SD
(
(R,P ), U|R| × U|P |
)
≤ ε/2 as long as
n/2 ≤ m+2−2 log 2ε , or, equivalently, (R,P ) is 2
(n/2−m)/2−1-close to U|R|×U|P |. Applying
Lemma 2 to A = R, B = P , C = U n
2
−v, D = Un
2
× Uv, we get that (R,P ) is ε-close to
U(n
2
)−v × P , for ε = 2
(n/2−m)/2. From here it follows that for extraction to be possible,
m ≥ n/2 + 2 log 1ε .
POST-APPLICATION ROBUSTNESS. In the post-application robustness security
game, the adversary A on receiving (P = (i,σ), R) (generated according to procedure
Gen) outputs P ′ = (i′,σ′), and is considered successful if (P ′ %= P ) ∧ [i′a + b]v1 = σ
′. In
our analysis, we will assume that i′ %= i. We claim that this does not reduce A’s success
probability. Indeed, if i′ = i then, for P ′ %= P to hold, A would have to output σ′ %= σ.
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However, when i′ = i, Rep would output ⊥ unless σ′ = σ.
In our analysis, we allow A to be deterministic. This is without loss of generality since
we allow an unbounded adversary. We also allow A to arbitrarily fix i. This makes the
result only stronger since we demonstrate robustness for a worst-case choice of i.
Since i is fixed andA is deterministic, (σ, R) determines the transcript tr = (i,σ, R, i ′,σ′).
For any particular tr, let Succtr be the event that the transcript is tr and A wins, i.e., that
ia + b = σ||R ∧ [i′a + b]v1 = σ
′. We denote by Badtr the set of w = a||b that make Succtr
true. For any tr, Prw[Succtr] ≤ |Badtr|2−m, because each w in Badtr occurs with probability
at most 2−m. We now partition the set Badtr into 2# disjoint sets, indexed by R′ ∈ {0, 1}#:
BadR
′
tr
def
= {w |w ∈ Badtr ∧ [i
′a+ b]#v+1 = R
′}
= {w | (ia+ b = σ||R) ∧ (i′a+ b = σ′||R′)}
For a particular value of (tr, R′), w = a||b is uniquely determined by the constraints
that define the above set Therefore, |BadR
′
tr | = 1. Since Badtr =
⋃
R′∈{0,1}! Bad
R′
tr , we
get |Badtr| ≤ 2# = 2n/2−v. From here it follows that
Pr[Succtr] ≤ |Badtr|2
−m ≤ 2n/2−v−m .
Pr[Succtr] measures the probability that the transcript is tr and A succeeds. To find out
the probability that A succeeds, we need to simply add Pr[Succtr] over all possible tr. Since
a transcript is completely determined by σ, R, the total number of possible transcripts is
2|σ|+|R| = 2n/2 and, therefore, A’s probability of success is at most 2n−v−m.
To achieve δ-robustness, we need to set v to at least n−m+log 1δ . From here it follows
that % = n2 − v ≤
1
2 (2m− n− 2 log
1
δ ).
3.1 Getting Closer to Uniform
If ε is so low that the constraint m ≥ n/2+2 log 1ε is not satisfied, then in our construction
we can simply shorten R by β = n/2 + 2 log 1ε −m bits, as follows: keep v = n−m+ log
1
δ
(regardless of %), and let R = [ia + b]#+vv+1, for any % ≤ 2m − n − log
1
δ − 2 log
1
ε . This
11
keeps σ the same, but shortens R enough for the leftover hash lemma to work. The proof
remains essentially the same, except that to prove robustness, we will give the remaining
bits [ia+ b]n/2#+v+1 for free to A.
4 Comparison with the Construction of Dodis, Katz, Reyzin and Smith
4.1 When the Robustness Constraint Dominates
The construction of Dodis et al. [6] parses w as two strings a and b of lengths n − v and
v, respectively. The values σ, R are computed as σ = [ia]v1 + b and R = [ia]
n
v+1; P = (i,σ).
Notice that, like in our construction, increasing v improves robustness and decreases the
number of extracted bits. For pre-application robustness, setting v = n−m+log 1δ suffices,
and thus the construction extracts nearly (2m − n) bits. However, for post-application
robustness, a much higher v is needed, giving only around 13(2m− n) extracted bits.
The post-application robustness game reveals more information to A about w than the
pre-application robustness game. This additional information—namely, R—may make it
easier for A to guess σ′ for a well-chosen i′. The key to our improvement is in the pairwise
independence of the function ia + b that computes both σ and R: because of pairwise
independence, the value (σ, R) of the function on input i tells A nothing about the value
(σ′, R′) on another input i′. (This holds, of course, for uniformly chosen key (a, b); when
(a, b) has entropy m, then A can find out n−m bits of information about σ ′.)
In contrast, in the construction of [6], only σ is computed using a pairwise independent
hash function. This works well (in fact, better than our construction, because b can be
shorter) for pre-application robustness, where A does not find out R. But it makes it
possible for R to decrease A’s uncertainty about σ ′ by as much as % = |R|, thus necessitating
the length v of σ′ (and hence σ) to be v > %+ (n −m) (the (n −m) term is the amount
of entropy already potentially “missing” from σ ′ because of the nonuniformity of w). See
Section 4.4 for a detailed description of an adversarial strategy that utilizes R to obtain σ ′
in the [6] construction.
Another way to see the differences between the two constructions is through the proof.
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In the proof of post-application robustness, the transcript tr includes R, which makes for 2#
times more transcripts than in the proof of pre-application robustness. However, the fact
that this R imposes an additional constraint of w, thus reducing the size of the set Badtr,
can compensate for this increase. It turns out that for the construction of [6], this additional
constraint can be redundant if the adversary is clever about choosing i′ and σ′, and the
size of Badtr doesn’t decrease. Using a pairwise-independent function for computing R in
our construction ensures that this additional constraint decreases the size of Badtr by 2#.
Thus, our construction achieves the same results for pre- and post-application robustness.
4.2 When the Uniformity Constraint Dominates
It should be noted that there may be reasonable cases when the uniformity constraint
ε on R is strong enough that the construction of [6] extracts even fewer bits, because
it needs to take v ≥ n − m + 2 log 1ε to ensure near-uniformity of R given P . In that
case, as long as m ≥ n/2 + 2 log 1ε , our construction will extract the same amount of bits
as before, thus giving it an even bigger advantage. And when m < n/2 + 2 log 1ε , our
construction still extracts at least 3/2 times more bits than the construction of [6], even
with the improvement of Section 4.3 applied (this can be seen by algebraic manipulation
of the relevant parameters for the post-application robustness case).
4.3 Improving the Construction of DKRS When the Uniformity Constraint
Dominates
Recall that the construction of Dodis et al. [6] parses w as two strings a and b of lengths
n− v and v, respectively. The values σ, R are computed as σ = [ia]v1 + b and R = [ia]
n
v+1;
P = (i,σ). In order to get R to be uniform given P , the value v is increased until the
leftover hash lemma can be applied to (R,σ). However, we observe that this unnecessarily
increases the length of σ (i.e., for every bit added to v, two bits are subtracted from R).
Instead, we propose to improve this construction with essentially the same technique as we
use for our construction in Section 3.1. The idea is to simply shorten R without increasing
the length of σ. This improvement applies to both pre- and post-application robustness.
13
For post-application robustness, suppose the uniformity constraint dominates, i.e.,
2 log 1ε > (2m−n+log
1
δ )/3. Modify the construction of [6] by setting v = (2n−m+log
1
δ )/3
and R = [ia]n−v−βv+1 , where β = 2 log
1
ε − (2m−n− log
1
δ )/3. This will result in an extracted
key of length % = (4m− 2n− log 1δ )/3− 2 log
1
ε . However, even with the improvement, the
extracted key will be always shorter than the key extracted by our scheme, as explained
in Section 4.2
In contrast, this improvement seems useful in the case of pre-application robustness.
Again, suppose the uniformity constraint dominates, i.e., 2 log 1ε > log
1
δ . Modify the
construction of [6] by setting v = n−m+log 1δ and R = [ia]
n−v−β
v+1 , where β = 2 log
1
ε−log
1
δ .
This will result in an extracted key of length % = 2m − n − 2 log 1ε − log
1
δ , which is
2 log 1ε − log
1
δ longer than the key extracted without this modification.
4.4 Why the construction of DKRS cannot extract more bits
For post-application robustness, the concern is that R can reveal information to the ad-
versary about σ′ for a cleverly chosen i′. Because the length of σ′ is v and % + (n − m)
bits of information about σ′ may be available (the % term comes from |R|, and (n − m)
term comes from the part of w which has no entropy), this leads to the requirement that
v ≥ %+ n−m+ log 1δ to make sure the adversary has to guess at least log
1
δ bits about σ
′.
Plugging in % = n− 2v, we obtain % ≤ 23(m− n/2− log
1
δ ), which is the amount extracted
by the construction.
Here we show an adversarial strategy that indeed utilizes R to obtain information about
σ′ to succeed with probability δ/2. This demonstrates that the analysis in [6] is tight up to
one bit. To do so we have to fix a particular (and somewhat unusual) representation of field
elements. (Recall that any representation of field elements works for constructions here and
in [6], as long as addition of field elements corresponds to the exclusive-or of bit strings.)
Typically, one views F2n−v as F2[x]/(p(x)) for some irreducible polynomial p of degree n−v,
and represents elements as F2-valued vectors in the basis (xn−v−1, xn−v−2, ..., x2, x, 1). We
will do the same, but will reorder the basis elements so as to separate the even and the odd
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powers of x: (xn−v−1, xn−v−3, . . . , x, xn−v−2, xn−v−4, . . . , 1) (assuming, for concreteness,
that n− v is even). The advantage of this representation for us is that the top half of bits
of some value z ∈ F2n−v is equal to the bottom half of the bits of z/x, as long as the last
bit of z is 0.
Now suppose the distribution on w is such that the top n−m bits of b are 0 (the rest
of the bits of w are uniform). Then by receiving σ and R, the adversary gets to see the top
%+ (n −m) bits of ia. Therefore, the adversary knows %+ (n −m) bits from the bottom
half of ia/x as long as the last bit of ia is 0, which happens with probability 1/2. To use
this knowledge, the adversary will simply ensure that the difference between σ ′ and σ is
[ia/x]v1, by letting i
′ = i+ i/x.
Thus, the adversarial strategy is as follows: let i′ = i + i/x; let τ consist of the % bits
of R, the top n − m bits of σ, and log 1δ = v − % − (n − m) randomly guessed bits, and
let σ′ = σ + τ . The adversary wins whenever τ = [ia/x]v1, which happens with probability
2v−#−(n−m)/2 = δ/2, because all but log 1δ bits of τ are definitely correct as long as the last
bit of ia is 0.
The above discussion gives us the following result.
Theorem 2 There exists a basis for GF (2n−v) such that for any integer m there exists
a distribution W of min-entropy m for which the post-application robustness of the con-
struction from [6, Theorem 3] can be violated with probability at least δ/2, where v is set as
required for robustness δ by the construction (i.e., v = (n−%)/2 for % = (2m−n−2 log 1δ )/3).
Note that our lower bound uses a specific representation of field elements, and hence
does not rule out that for some particular representation of field elements, a lower value
of v and, therefore, a higher value of % is possible. However, a security proof for a lower
value of v would have to then depend on the properties of that particular representation
and would not cover the construction of [6] in general.
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5 Tolerating Binary Hamming Errors
We now consider the scenario where Bob has a string w′ that is close to Alice’s input w
(in the Hamming metric). In order for them to agree on a random string, Bob would first
have recover w from w′. To this end, Alice could send the secure sketch s = SS(w) to
Bob along with (i,σ). To prevent an undetected modification of s to s′, she could send
an authentication of s (using w as the key) as well. The nontriviality of making such an
extension work arises from the fact that modifying s to s′ also gives the adversary the power
to influence Bob’s verification key w∗ = SRec(w′, s′). The adversary could perhaps exploit
this circularity to succeed in an active attack (the definition of standard authentication
schemes only guarantee security when the keys used for authentication and verification are
the same).
We break this circularity by exploiting the algebraic properties of the Hamming metric
space, and using authentication secure against algebraic manipulation [6, 5]. The tech-
niques that we use are essentially the same as used in [6], but adapted to our construction.
We present the construction here and then discuss the exact properties that we use in the
proof of security.
CONSTRUCTION. Let M be the Hamming metric space on {0, 1}n. Let W be a
distribution of min-entropy m over M. Let s = SS(w) be a deterministic, linear secure
sketch; let |s| = k, n′ = n − k. Assume that SS is a surjective linear function (which is
the case for the syndrome construction for the Hamming metric mentioned in Section 2).
Therefore, there exists a k × n matrix S of rank k such that SS(w) = Sw. Let S⊥ be an
n′ × n matrix such that n× n matrix
(
S
S⊥
)
has full rank. We let SS⊥(w) = S⊥(w).
To compute Gen(w), let s = SS(w), c = SS⊥(w); |c| = n′. We assume that n′ is even
(if not, drop one bit of c, reducing its entropy by at most 1). Let a be the first half of
c and b the second. View a, b as elements of F2n′/2 . Let L = 2,
k
n′ - (it will important
for security that L is even). Pad s with 0s to length Ln′/2, and then split it into L bit
strings sL−1, . . . , s0 of length n′/2 bits each, viewing each bit string as an element of F2n′/2 .
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Select i ← F2n′/2 . Define fs,i(x) = x
L+3 + x2(sL−1xL−1 + sL−2xL−2 + · · · + s0) + ix. Set
σ = [fs,i(a) + b]v1, and output P = (s, i,σ) and R = [fs,i(a) + b]
n′/2
v+1 .
Gen(w):
1. Set s = SS(w), c = SS⊥(w), k = |s|, n′ = |c|.
- Let a = [c]n
′/2
1 , b = [c]
n′
n′/2+1
- Let L = 2, kn′ -. Pad s with 0s to length Ln
′/2.
- Parse the padded s as sL−1||sL−2|| . . . ||s0 for si ∈ F2n′/2 .
2. Select i← F2n′/2 .
3. Set σ = [fs,i(a) + b]v1, and output R = [fs,i(a) + b]
n′/2
v+1 and P = (s, i,σ).
Rep(w′, P ′ = (s′, i′,σ′)):
1. Compute w∗ = SRec(w′, s′)
- Verify that dis(w∗, w′) ≤ t and SS(w∗) = s′. If not, output ⊥.
2. Let c′ = SS⊥(w∗). Parse c′ as a′||b′.
3. Compute σ∗ = [fs′,i′(a
′) + b′]v1.
- Verify that σ∗ = σ′. If so, output R = [fs′,i′(a′) + b′]
n′/2
v+1 , else output ⊥.
In the theorem statement below, let B denote the volume of a Hamming ball or radius t
in {0, 1}n (logB ≤ nH2(t/n) [11, Chapter 10, §11, Lemma 8] and logB ≤ t log(n+1) [6]).
Theorem 3 Assume SS is a deterministic linear (m,m − k, t)−secure sketch of out-
put length k for the Hamming metric on {0, 1}n. Setting v = (n − k)/2 − l, the above
construction is an (m, l, t, ε) fuzzy extractor with robustness δ for any m, l, t, ε satisfying
l ≤ m− n/2− k − logB − log
(
2
⌈
k
n−k
⌉
+ 2
)
− log 1δ as long as m ≥
1
2 (n+ k) + 2 log
1
ε .
Again, if m < 12 (n + k) + 2 log
1
ε , the construction can be modified, as shown in Sec-
tion 5.1.
Proof. EXTRACTION. Our goal is to show that R is nearly uniform given P = (i, s,σ).
To do so, we first note that for every s, the function hi(c) = (σ, R) is a universal hash
family. Indeed for c %= c′ there is a unique i such that hi(c) = hi(c′) (since i(a − a′) is
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fixed, like in the errorless case). We also note that H˜∞(c | SS(W )) ≥ H˜∞(c,SS(W ))− k =
H∞(W )− k = m− k by Lemma 2. Because |(R,σ)| = n′/2, Lemma 2 (or, more precisely,
its generalization mentioned in the paragraph following the lemma, needed here because
hi depends on s) gives us
SD
(
(R,P ), U|R| × SS(W )× Un′/2 × Uv
)
≤ ε/2
for n′/2 ≤ m−k+2−2 log(2/ε). This is equivalent to saying that (R,P ) is 2(n
′/2−m+k) 1
2
−1-
close to U|R| × SS(W )× Un′/2 × Uv.
Applying Lemma 2 to A = R, B = P , C = Un′/2−v, D = SS(w) × Un′/2 × Uv, we get
that (R,P ) is ε-close to U n′
2
−v
× P , for ε = 2(
n′
2
−m+k)/2.
From here it follows that for extraction to be possible, m ≥ 12(n+ k) + 2 log
1
ε .
POST-APPLCIATION ROBUSTNESS. In the post-application robustness security
game, the adversary A on receiving (P = (s, i,σ), R) (generated according to procedure
Gen) outputs P ′ = (s′, i′,σ′), and is considered successful if (P ′ %= P )∧Rep(w′, s′) %= ⊥. In
our analysis, we will assume that (i′, s′) %= (i, s). We claim that this does not reduce A’s
success probability. Indeed, if (i′, s′) = (i, s) then, c′ computed within Rep will equal c. So,
for P ′ %= P to hold, A would have to output σ′ %= σ. However, when (i′, c′, s′) = (i, c, s),
Rep would compute σ∗ = σ, and therefore would output ⊥ unless σ ′ = σ.
In our analysis, we allow A to be deterministic. This is without loss of generality since
we allow an unbounded adversary. We also allow A to arbitrarily fix i. This makes the
result only stronger since we demonstrate robustness for a worst-case choice of i.
Since i is fixed and A is deterministic, the tr = (i, s,σ, R, i′, s′,σ′) is determined com-
pletely by (s,σ, R). Recall that the prime challenge in constructing a robust fuzzy extractor
was that A could somehow relate the key used by Rep to verify σ ′ to the authentication
key that was used by Gen to come up with σ. As was done in [6], we will argue security
of our construction by showing that the MAC scheme implicitly used in our construction
remains unforgeable even when A could force the verification key to be at an offset (of
her choice) from the authentication key. We will formalize such an argument by assuming
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that A learns ∆ = w′ − w. Recall that w∗ = SRec(w′, s′) and c′ = a′||b′ = SS⊥(w∗). The
following claim that was proven in [6] states that given (∆, s), A can compute the offsets
∆a = a′ − a,∆b = b′ − b induced by her choice of s′.
Claim 1. Given ∆ = w′ − w, and the sketches s, s′,A can compute ∆a = a′ − a and
∆b = b′ − b, or determine that Rep will reject before computing a′, b′.
In other words, she can compute the offset between the authentication key that Gen
used to come up with σ and the verification key that Rep will use to verify σ ′. We will now
argue that as long asW has sufficient min-entropy, even knowing the offset does not help A
succeed in an active attack. Recall that since i is arbitrarily fixed by A, A’s success depends
on w,w′, or, alternatively, on w,∆. Fix some ∆. For any particular tr, let Succtr,∆ be the
event that the transcript is tr and A wins, i.e., that fs,i(a) + b = σ||R ∧ [fs′,i′(a′) + b′]v1 =
σ′ ∧ SS(w) = s, conditioned on the fact that w′ −w is ∆. We denote by Badtr,∆ the set of
w that make Succtr,∆ true. We now partition the set Badtr,∆ into 2# disjoint sets, indexed
by R′ ∈ {0, 1}#:
BadR
′
tr,∆
def
= {w |w ∈ Badtr,∆ ∧ [fs′,i′(a
′) + b′]#v+1 = R
′}
= {w | (fs,i(a) + b = σ||R) ∧ (fs′,i′(a
′) + b′ = σ′||R′) ∧ SS(w) = s}.
By Claim 1, fixing (tr,∆), also fixes ∆a,∆b. It follows that every w ∈ Bad
R′
tr,∆ needs to
satisfy
fs,i(a)− fs′,i′(a+∆a) = (∆b + σ − σ
′)||(R −R′) ∧ SS(w) = s.
For a given tr,∆, R′, the right hand side of the first equation takes a fixed value. Let us
now focus on the polynomial fs,i(a)− fs′,i′(a+∆a). We will consider two cases:
• ∆a = 0: In this case, fs,i(x)−fs′,i′(x) is a polynomial in which a coefficient of degree
2 or higher is nonzero if s %= s′ and a coefficient of degree 1 or higher is nonzero if
i %= i′.
• ∆a %= 0: Observe that the leading term of the polynomial is ((L+3) mod 2)∆axL+2.
Since we forced L to be even, the coefficient of the leading term is nonzero, making
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fs,i(x)− fs′,i′(x+∆a) a polynomial of degree L+ 2.
Therefore, in either case, the fs,i(x)−fs′,i′(x+∆a) is a nonconstant polynomial of degree at
most L+2. A nonconstant polynomial of degree d can take on a fixed value at most d times.
It, therefore, follows that there are at most L+2 values of a such that fs,i(a)−fs′,i′(a+∆a) =
(∆b + σ − σ′)||(R − R′). Each such a uniquely determines b = (σ||R) − fs,i(a). And w is
uniquely determined by c = a||b = SS⊥(w) and s = SS(w). Therefore, there are at most
L+2 values of w in the set BadR
′
tr,∆ i.e, |Bad
R′
tr,∆| ≤ L+2. Since Badtr,∆ =
⋃
R′∈{0,1}! Bad
R′
tr,∆,
we get |Badtr,∆| ≤ (L + 2)2# = (L + 2)2n
′/2−v. Thus, Prw[Succtr,∆] ≤ |Badtr|2−H∞(w|∆) ≤
(L+ 2)2n
′/2−v−H∞(w|∆).
To find out the probability Prw[Succ∆] that A succeeds conditioned on a particular ∆,
we need to add up Prw[Succtr,∆] over all possible transcripts. Recalling that each transcript
is determined by σ, R and s and hence there are 2n
′/2+k of them, and that n′ + k = n, we
get Prw[Succ∆] ≤ (L+ 2)2n−v−H∞(w|∆).
Finally, the probability of adversarial success it at most
E
∆
Pr
w
[Succ∆] ≤ (L+ 2)2
n−v− eH∞(w|∆) .
In particular, if the errors ∆ are independent of w, then H˜∞(w|∆) = H∞(w) = m, and
the probability of adversarial success is at most (L+2)2n−v−m. In the worst case, however,
the entropy of w may decrease at most by the number of bits needed to represent ∆. Let
B be the volume of the hamming ball of radius t in {0, 1}n. Then, ∆ can be represented
in logB bits and H˜∞(w|∆) ≥ m− logB, by Lemma 2. From here it follows that
Pr[A′s success] ≤ B(L+ 2)2n−v−m
To achieve δ−robustness, we want B(L+ 2)2n−v−m ≤ δ i.e., v ≥ n−m+ logB + log(L+
2)+ log 1δ . Setting v = n−m+ logB+ log(L+2)+ log
1
δ , and using L = 2,
k
n−k - it follows
that
% ≤ m− n/2− k − logB − log
(
2
⌈
k
n− k
⌉
+ 2
)
− log 1δ .
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5.1 Getting Closer to Uniform
If ε is so low that m ≥ 12(n + k) + 2 log
1
ε does not hold, we can modify our construction
just as we did in section 3.1, by shortening R by β = 12(n + k) + 2 log
1
ε − m. That is,
keep v = n − m + logB + log(L + 2) + log 1δ fixed and let R = [fs,i(a) + b]
#+v
v+1, where
% ≤ n/2− v − β.
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